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ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the proper taxonomy of the semantics-pragmatics di-
vide. Debates about taxonomy are not always pointless. In interesting cases taxonomic
proposals involve theoretical assumptions about the studied field, which might be judged
correct or incorrect. Here I want to contrast an approach to the semantics-pragmatics dicho-
tomy, motivated by a broadly Gricean perspective I take to be correct, with a contemporary
version of an opposing “Wittgensteinian” view. I will focus mostly on a well-known ex-
ample: the treatment of referential uses of descriptions and descriptive uses of indexicals.
The paper is structured as follows. I will start by characterizing in the first section the ver-
sion of the Gricean approach I favor; in the second section, I will illustrate the differences
between the two views by focussing on the example, and in the third section I will object
to what I take to be the main Wittgensteinian consideration.
1. A GRICEAN ACCOUNT OF THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS
DISTINCTION
The form of the Gricean view I wish to defend makes the following main
claims about semantics. (1) Semantic facts are facts establishing what ex-
pressions conventionally or literally mean in a given public language. In
the focal case of utterances, conventional meaning consists in what the ut-
terance says, which in turn is to be analyzed in a type of illocutionary force
and a truth-condition, and what the utterance conventionally presupposes
– in Grice’s terms, its conventional implicatures. (2) Semantic facts about
utterances are determined by semantic facts about their parts and about
syntactic features they instantiate. (3) Semantic facts, about both utterances
and their compositional structure, are determined by facts about a form of
rational activity whose constitutive goals are those captured in Gricean
explications of speaker-meaning. This is why utterances are the focal case,
and also why their linguistic meanings decompose in the three-fold way
indicated in (1).
We can put these three Gricean claims about semantics in terms of
Lewis’ (1975) distinction between possible languages and the actual lan-
guage used by a population, and what in the same work Lewis calls a
grammar: a compositional account of what is meant by utterances on the
Synthese 128: 93–131, 2001.
© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
94 MANUEL GARCı´A-CARPINTERO
basis of semantic properties of words and semantic properties of syntactic
features. Possible languages are stipulated to be functions assigning pos-
sible conventional meanings to possible utterances. Then, the preceding
points come to the following contentions. Conventional regularities in-
volving the use of words and syntactic features in utterances sufficiently
determine (up to the measure of indeterminacy that is reasonable to expect
in these matters) the language spoken by a population and its grammar.
And utterances are the kind of rational activity explicated in Gricean
accounts of speaker-meaning.
Let us say that the L-linguistic capacities of a speaker S of a used lan-
guage L are those specifically constitutive of his knowledge of the semantic
facts concerning L. Then, the Gricean view concerning pragmatic facts
about a used language L is that these are facts establishing what speakers of
L, in virtue of general rational abilities over and above their specifically L-
linguistic abilities, are able to mean non-conventionally with expressions
having semantic properties by exploiting those semantic properties. The
Gricean insists that, in theoretically characterizing the semantics of used
language L, it is important not to be misled by the merely pragmatic. Both
are constitutively determined by a specific form of rational activity; what
distinguishes them is the way in which they involve given conventional
regularities.
The Gricean theoretical perspective has been described in a recent book
on the philosophy of language as deservedly “often seen today as a de-
generating research program” (Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 289).
The fact that Schiffer, one of the philosophers who has made more im-
portant contributions to the program, has become one of its fiercest critics
(see Schiffer 1987, ch. 9), lends some support to this claim.1 However,
in my view, none of the arguments on which either Schiffer or Lance
and O’Leary-Hawthorne base their allegations should persuade us that the
Gricean program is in fact degenerating. They only reflect an inaccurate
way of conceiving the goals of the program – even if it is one that is wide-
spread among defenders of the Gricean approach, conspicuously among
them, Schiffer’s earlier self.
The version of the Gricean approach I have outlined is immune to the
objections by writers like those just mentioned because it differs in three
important respects from others. Firstly, it ascribes a more complicated
form to the explicated concepts, than simple definitions, in terms of a set
of jointly sufficient necessary conditions. Secondly, it does not provide
a reduction of social to psychological properties. And thirdly, it is com-
mitted to ascribing compositional structure to linguistic meanings. I will
briefly comment on these three points. The remarks which follow fall short
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of providing the rational support that these controversial claims require.
Nevertheless, I hope that they give the reader an indication of the line of
thought I rely upon, without which, I fear, the kind of view I defend in the
paper will not be taken seriously these days.
The fundamental concepts are not to be explicated by stating a number
of jointly sufficient necessary conditions. The first difference with other
Gricean accounts lies in seeing Gricean explications – including ancillary
explications of speaker-meaning and of convention – as capturing ‘family
resemblance’ conceptions: cluster concepts, whose weighted conditions of
application jointly provide sufficient conditions for paradigm cases, but are
only required to apply to the extent of their respective relative weights.
There are two different goals entwined in projects such as the Gricean
one – projects aiming at providing a rational reconstruction or explication
of a pre-existing notion – which must be kept separate. There is, firstly, a
descriptive goal: we want to provide information about a real phenomenon
(linguistic meaning, in our case); not, indeed, by imparting knowledge
about it not previously possessed by anybody, but rather by presenting
in an explicit form facts only tacitly or implicitly or, as I prefer to say
for reasons given later (borrowing a useful term from a dubious source)
unthematizedly known before.2 And there is, secondly, a normative goal.
Possessing a concept is, constitutively, something good, or valuable, in
that it allows its possessor to attain certain goals (goals among those con-
stitutive of rationality). Having a (correct) rational reconstruction of an
unthematized concept should be better with respect to those very goals
than merely having the latter. Having a rationally reconstructed concept of
X is not better than merely having an unthematized concept of X for every
possible goal; for instance, only the unthematized concept might allow the
sort of quick thinking we need in ordinary life. But it should allow having
more true beliefs and beliefs epistemically better justified about X, having
intentions concerning X more capable of standing rational scrutiny, and so
on.
When we take into consideration the normative goal, it is clear that
fully precise explications providing necessary and sufficient conditions of
application for the explicated notion are ideal. For those concepts whose
unthematized forms are not that precise (for instance, in that they appear
to be of a prototypical nature), however, this might involve a prima facie
conflict with the descriptive goal. Now, to the extent that the relevant
unthematized concepts are concepts of objective entities, and a realist
attitude about the entities in question is required, the conflict, it seems
to me, is merely apparent, as witnessed by, say, concepts of tigers. The
unreconstructed concept which we ordinary people have is imprecise, be-
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ing perhaps constituted by a prototype and a similarity rider; but nothing
stands in the way of introducing, on the basis of empirical findings, a fully
precise characterization of the so conceived entities, by giving necessary
and sufficient conditions (a description of the shared genome perhaps).
In my view, it is a mere prejudice to think that the same does not apply
when we are dealing with thematized conceptions not empirically based,
but proposed as a priori philosophical explications. The reason why it is a
prejudice is not that there is no relevant distinction between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge, or between analytic and synthetic truth.3 But it is a
prejudice nonetheless; in fact, this is, in a general form, the very prejudice
which, in its specific application to conceptions of linguistic meaning, we
will be discussing here.
I do not know of any good reason to think that linguistic meaning is
a phenomenon any less objective than tigerhood, or regarding which we
should adopt an attitude that is in any way less realist (although there
are arguments to that effect by Davidson, followers of Wittgenstein and
others). Chomsky has provided good reasons to think that the best char-
acterizations to be given of an actual language will be based in part on
empirical findings: data about acquisition and loss of linguistic compet-
ence, about computational processing, perhaps about the modular structure
of the human brain, etc. Taking into account then, the normative aspect
of the project of rational reconstruction, it was understandable that Grice,
Schiffer and others attempted to provide fully precise definitions, in the
form of jointly sufficient necessary conditions. The pattern of objections
to the explications (including both objections to the sufficiency of the
analyses, and to the necessity of some conditions) suggests, however, that
the descriptive goals of the program can only be attained by conceiving
the unthematized concepts as “family resemblance” ones, constituted by
a cluster of weighted conditions, which only apply jointly to paradigm
cases. This is compatible with our rational reconstructions being as precise
as we could want them to be. (Although constructing them might well
require taking decisions which cannot be justified on the basis of our clear
intuitions about what we would count or would not count as cases of lin-
guistic meaning, but only on more theoretically-driven considerations.4 )
It is only that the resulting explications cannot be as simple as they are
usually assumed to be. Instead of a list of necessary conditions which are
jointly sufficient, we should provide definitions of a series of related cases,
starting by paradigm ones and continuing with cases which depart further
and further from the prototype.
Although I will not go into the details here, I hope this will be enough
for the reader to envisage how common objections to the necessity of the
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conditions in Gricean explications of linguistic meaning, and the ancil-
lary notions of speaker-meaning and convention, can be dealt with if this
suggestion is adopted. Consider, as an example, an habitual objection to
Lewis’ (1975) definition of convention, which I take to be fundamentally
on the right track as an explication of paradigm cases of conventions. With
this view, conventions are regularities rationally “self-perpetuated” in that
conformity and secured by the expectations of participants that others will
conform to, given that they have certain goals. Lewis includes a clause to
the effect that conventions are arbitrary, in that a different regularity could
have served the same goals, and another clause stating that the clauses
of the definition are known, and indeed commonly or mutually known,
by participants. A usual objection (Burge 1975, 250; Laurence 1996, 277;
Millikan 1998, 165–6) is based on regularities (like keeping a certain dis-
tance when talking to others, or even using a given language in some cases)
which we would count as conventional, although participants in them do
not know, still less know mutually, that they are arbitrary. This can be
handled by acknowledging that the mutual knowledge condition captures
only prototypical cases, but has only a relative small weight in determining
the conventional nature of a regularity. The resulting view will still differ
from the alternatives that are supported on the basis of examples like those,
for instance, by the three writers I have mentioned. It will differ precisely
regarding what I take to be the really distinctive Gricean point here, closely
related to the main point at stake in the debate we will be examining:
the claim that prototypical conventions are rationally self-perpetuating
regularities in behavior.5
The appeal to speaker-meaning, although essential and explanatory,
does not provide a reduction of the social to the psychological. The
second difference between the present Gricean account and others lies
in its abandoning of any reductionist ambitions. The conceptual priority
assigned in Gricean views to speaker-meaning is not seen here as further-
ing a reduction of the social to the psychological (and perhaps ultimately
to the non-intentional). The point of claiming that conventional acts of
meaning are also acts of speaker-meaning is to say that they are not merely
natural occurrences, but rather natural occurrences constituting the sort of
rational act captured in Gricean explications of speaker-meaning. There
is no further claim that, in giving a rational reconstruction of the act of
meaning made by the literal speaker, we can avoid referring in any way to
the conventions constituting the public language the speaker takes himself
to speak. In fact, I believe this cannot be avoided.
What is definitely Gricean about the Gricean explication of literal
meaning is the appeal in the explication to a conceptually prior notion of
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speaker-meaning. Now, some writers interpret this conceptual priority of
speaker-meaning in the following reductionist way. Pre-theoretically, the
concept of expression-meaning is social in that it involves claims contain-
ing quantification over (or reference to) distinctively social entities, such as
conventional regularities in the behavior of the members of a community
C. It thus involves a prima facie ontological commitment to those social
entities. The reductionist interpretation of the Gricean priority of speaker-
meaning over expression-meaning is motivated by the hope of showing
that the only ontological commitments which we in fact incur in apply-
ing a sensible concept of expression-meaning concern folk-psychological
entities like believings and intendings. Griceans such as Schiffer (1972),
Lewis (1975), Bennett (1976) and Loar (1981) are all reductionist in this
sense; they all express the hope I have just mentioned.
Thus, Schiffer writes as follows: “It is essential to the programme of
providing an account of the meaning of utterance-types in terms of a ba-
sic account of S-meaning that what S means by uttering x is not at all
determined by what is uttered, i.e., by the value of ‘x’. [. . . ] If the only
difference between two utterances is that in one case S utters x and in the
other S utters y, then what S means by uttering x is identical with what
S means by uttering y. The importance of this condition is that if it were
the case that what S meant by uttering x were determined, even in part,
by the meaning of x, then this would, on the face of it, render circular
an account of what x means in terms of what is or would be meant by
uttering x” (Schiffer 1972, 64–5). As illustration, Schiffer argues that in
uttering σ1 ‘The cat is on the mat’ a speaker would mean the same as in
uttering σ2 ‘My primary intention in uttering this sentence is to produce in
you – by means of recognition of intention – the belief that the cat is on
the mat’ (which he takes to be synonymous with the explicit performative
‘I (hereby) tell you that the cat is on the mat’). I am not interested here
in discussing Schiffer’s considerations on these particular examples, but
in illustrating the consequences of adopting a reductionist attitude and in
highlighting the differences regarding the view advanced here. I myself
believe that, precisely because of the independent, conventional difference
in meaning between the sentences uttered in σ1 and σ2, any competent
speaker will literally mean different propositions by those utterances; even
though, in any ordinary speech situation, the speaker of σ2 conveys what
the speaker of σ1 literally means.6
Consider typical examples of speaker-meaning produced to support the
reductionist hope. In one of Borges’ short stories, “El jardín de los sen-
deros que se bifurcan”, Yu Tsun, a German spy in England during the
First World War, finds no better way of communicating to his superiors
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in Berlin that the city they should bomb is Albert, than killing a man
named ‘Albert’. (Yu Tsun makes sure that the news of such an apparently
unmotivated murder will be in newspapers read in Berlin.) This fits nicely
with Grice’s original explication of speaker-meaning: by “uttering” his
murdering of Albert, Yu Tsun intends his superior to judge that the city
to bomb is Albert precisely through the recognition of Yu Tsun’s intention
that he so judges. Now, it is certainly the case that Yu Tsun’s “utterance”
is not a conventional device for informing someone that Albert is the city
that should be bombed. It certainly informs (assuming the usual Gricean
explication of informing S that p that fits nicely this example), but it is not
a conventional device for doing that.
However, attaining the goal of convincing us, on the basis of ex-
amples like this, that the reductionist hope stated three paragraphs back,
can be realized, requires rather more than this. It requires convincing us
that Yu-Tsun’s communicative intentions “are not intrinsically convention-
implying” (Loar 1981, 244). And this is doubtful. It is doubtful, in other
words, that what is involved in having intentions like Yu Tsun’s could be
explicated without committment to the existence of linguistic conventions.
The reductionist will accept that, as a matter of actual fact, to have inten-
tions like those a rational being ought to have learnt the relevant concepts
as a member of a linguistic community. He will insist, however, that there
exists at least the conceptual possibility of having the relevant thoughts “in
isolation”. But I think there are serious reasons, ultimately Wittgenstein-
ian in spirit, to doubt this. And not only with respect to cases involving
relatively complex thoughts like those that Yu Tsun intends to cause in his
audience. The point might well extend even to the thought that one has a
headache.
The form of the Gricean view I want to invoke differs thus from others
in that it rejects any reductionist ambitions. Acts of meaning are those
which can be accounted for on the basis of the Gricean explication of
speaker-meaning. The only sense in which they are not supposed to involve
conventions is that they do not necessarily involve the use of a conventional
device for conveying what is meant in them. Literal acts of meaning, on the
other hand, are acts of meaning which do involve the use of conventional
devices. Pragmatic acts of meaning, are acts in which a conventional device
is used in such a way that, what would be meant by it if literally used,
is not in fact, primarily meant by the speaker. What is Gricean in these
proposals is that (i) literally meaning M entails meaning M – and thus
performing a well-defined type of rational act – by means of a certain
conventional device for that purpose, while (ii) meaning M does not entail
having recourse to a conventional device for that purpose.7
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The main drive behind this paper can be characterized as that of
opposing two related forms of reductionism concerning linguistic mean-
ing: the Cartesian-internalist, advocated by writers like Schiffer, Loar or
Lewis, which aims to reduce linguistic meaning to a complicated set
of folk-psychological mental states of an isolated individual, and the
Chomskian-functionalist, illustrated by Schiffer’s more recent self and
by Laurence (1996), which would reduce linguistic meaning instead to
functional-cum-physical internal states of such an isolated individual.8 On
the view propounded here, an actual language is an objective entity in it-
self, which cannot be reduced by definition to other things. A manifestation
of this is that, in providing an explication of what it is that a literal speaker
means when uttering a given sentence, we need to make uneliminable
reference to the meaning of expressions in the (public) language he is
using.
What of Schiffer’s implied motivation for the Gricean to embrace re-
ductionism, based on the alleged explanatory vacuity of any alternative
account? How can a really explanatory reference to speaker-meaning be
made in explicating linguistic meaning? An analogy might help us here.
On the view of linguistic meaning I assume, the meaning of, say, ‘am-
bulo’ in Latin compositionally depends on the meaning of the verbal root
‘ambul-’ and the meaning of the lexeme ‘-o’. This is an application of some
form of Frege’s Principle of Compositionality; in these terms, we aim to
explain the systematicity of linguistic meaning – the fact that a compet-
ent speaker who understands ‘ambulo’ understands other expressions also,
like, say, ‘ambulabat’. However, some form of Frege’s Context Principle
applies also to linguistic meaning; this is required by our non-reductionist
appeal to speaker-meaning in the explication, for speaker-meaning is a
property of whole utterances. A verbal root like ‘ambul-’, and lexemes
like ‘-o’ or ‘-abat’, have only meaning in the context of a sentence; their
linguistic meaning has to be explicated in terms of their contribution to the
meaning of utterances made by means of the sentences they might contrib-
ute to form. Now, there appears to be a vicious circularity lurking here. If
the meaning of ‘ambul-’ depends on the meaning of the sentences in which
it might appear, thus on the meaning of the sentences it might contribute to
form together with lexemes including ‘-abat’, how can also be true that the
meaning of ‘ambulabat’ depends on the meanings of ‘ambul-’ and that of
‘-abat’? How can we really have an explanation of the systematic ability
to understand new sentences, like ‘ambulabat’, on the part of anybody
competently understanding ‘ambulo’? The ultimate worry here comes to
this: explanation entails dependence, but is dependence not asymmetric?
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The answer is that the articulation of our worry mixes up two different
kinds of dependence. The meaning of sentences depends specifically on
the meanings of each lexical unit and meaningful syntactic structure con-
stituting it; it is determined by semantic properties of each particular one of
them, and, as a result, to understand a sentence requires understanding of
each significant component. The meaning of units like ‘ambul-’ depends
generically on the meaning of the sentences it might contribute to form,
thus on the meaning of lexemes like ‘-o’ and ‘-abat’. The meaning of
‘ambul-’, i.e., cannot be specified without mentioning the meaning of some
or other lexeme like ‘-o’; but there is no particular lexeme whose mean-
ing is to be mentioned in giving the meaning of ‘ambul-’. Two speakers
might give the same meaning to the root, even though their respective
theories consider for it its combination with different lexemes. Thus, we
can properly explain how each of them understand new sentences: there
is no circularity in appealing to the meaning of ‘ambul-’ when accounting
for the meaning of ‘ambulabat’.
Similarly, on the view advanced here the literal meaning of an ut-
terance is a form of speaker-meaning which depends specifically on the
conventions of the public language on which the speaker’s communicat-
ive intentions rely. On the other hand, the conventions of any language
depend generically on some or other acts of speaker-meaning performed
by means of them. Linguistic expressions, in other words, only have the
literal meanings that they have relative to some or other rational acts of
speaker-meaning, performed by means of them in a conventional way. This
is compatible with the view that the meaning intended on any particular oc-
casion by the literal speaker, depends specifically on, and is to be explained
relative to, the conventions constituting the public language he purports to
be using. For the constitutive nature of the language is not dependent on
that particular case of literal meaning.
Even the weak form of dependence of literal meaning on speaker-
meaning advanced here is subject to well-known criticisms.9 Some of them
can be dealt with by taking into account the two differences with other
forms of the Gricean approach, already highlighted. For its crucial use in
the explication of linguistic meaning, I would only take the basic Gricean
explications of the speech-acts we might call “informing” (rationally trans-
miting knowledge to hearer by theoretical reasoning involving recognition
of intention) and “enjoining” (rationally leading the hearer to do something
by practical reasoning involving recognition of intention), modified with
some “mutual knowledge” clause, as explications of paradigm cases of
linguistic meaning. I would readily accept that the conditions are not ne-
cessary, having only certain balanced weights. There are many other other
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cases of linguistic meaning which simply cannot be characterized as forms
of the two previously mentioned. In this way, well-known responses to
well-known criticisms (“thinking out loud”, “the exam”, “speaking without
caring to produce any effect” and so on) can acquire a more convincing
shape.
There is one objection by a contemporary supporter of the Gricean
programme which I think I should discuss before moving to elaborate on
the third distinguishing mark of the present proposal; for, if correct, the
kind of response I have outlined would not do. Neale (1992) argues in
the following way against the “third clause” in Grice’s original account of
informing (the one stating that, in felicitous cases of informing that p, it is
rational for the speaker to intend that the belief that p be produced in the
audience through an inference involving the recognition of his intention):
“A serious problem seems to await Grice further down the road if he does
not concede that the third clause is overly restrictive. Ultimately, Grice
wants to define locutions of the form by uttering x, U said that p; but one
of the conjuncts in his proposed definiens is by uttering x, U meant that
p . . . . So if he refuses to allow that (e.g.) I can mean that I can speak in
a squeaky voice by uttering, in a squeaky voice, ‘I can speak in a squeaky
voice’, Grice will be forced either to conclude that I have not said that I
can speak in a squeaky voice, or else abandon the idea of defining saying
in terms of utterer’s meaning . . . . It would seem, then, that the third clause
will have to be discarded (or at least modified) if saying requires meaning”
(Neale 1992, 548–9).
For independent reasons already suggested, I am prepared to grant the
conclusion of this argument – namely, that the third clause is too restrictive,
i.e., it is not a necessary condition for linguistic meaning. Nevertheless, I
do want to keep it as characterizing prototypical cases of the phenomenon
we are explicating, while Neale’s argument would preclude even this.
Fortunately, there is a convincing reply to the argument. In a Gricean
account, it is not an event (an utterance) in itself which means something;
it is indeed an event, but only relative to a given feature or property it
instantiates.10 Neale’s argument overlooks this; it wrongly assumes that it
makes sense to appraise whether or not a speaker can mean something with
an utterance, without making this claim relative to a particular repeatable
feature of the concrete event at stake.
As I myself would put the Gricean point: a speaker cannot perform a
prototypical case of informing (and thus meaning) that he has a squeaky
voice by any event whose intended significant feature is that it is a case
of sounds uttered in a squeaky voice. The reason is Grice’s, i.e., that the
speaker thereby gives the hearer no adequate indication that the latter is
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intended to reach the judgment on the basis of recognition of the former’s
intention. On the other hand, a speaker can perform a fully prototypical
case of informing that he has a squeaky voice by uttering (or inscribing) a
sentence which is a conventional means for that, in a context in which
the default presumption that he is abiding by the relevant conventions
applies. Thus the only consequence that follows about the sort of case
Neale envisages (i.e., one of an event having those two features) from a
properly understood Gricean account is that it gives rise to a prima facie
conflict, whose resolution will depend on the details of the context. As a
result of such a conflict, Neale’s utterance may for instance be taken as a
case in which the speaker feels that he cannot restrict himself to inform
that he can do something, and is in fact showing that he has the ability in
question by exercising it – a different kind of speech-act. The utterance
thus acquires a meaning going beyond the literal, because offering the pro-
duction of squeaky sounds as a reason that one can produce them is not the
same speech act as informing of the latter, and it is one not conventionally
associated with an utterance of ‘I can speak in a squeaky voice’. Or it might
just be taken as a joke. In any case, the example does not force us either
to reject or to modify the third clause as it stands. (Although, as I said, we
have independent reasons for doing so.)11
The analysis takes linguistic meaning to be compositional. Finally, the
form of the Gricean perspective I subscribe to, insists that the Gricean
line that linguistic meaning entails speaker-meaning, extends to the de-
termination of the literal meanings of what we might call phrases: the
significant words and syntactic features which compositionally determine
what utterances conventionally mean. As indicated, no attempt at reduction
is involved in the claim that attributions of linguistic meaning to them are
to be understood in terms of speaker-meaning; only that those attributions
are to be based on the way they conventionally contribute to rational acts
which have the nature captured in Gricean accounts of speaker-meaning.
The reason for an account like this to help itself to what David Lewis
(1975) calls a grammar (a compositional account of what is literally meant
by utterances on the basis of semantic properties of words and syntactic
features) is that, otherwise, the appeal to speaker-meaning cannot provide
a necessary condition for what is said by possible utterances of sentences
(i) too long or too complicated to be actually uttered, or (ii) trivially true
or for uttering which no speaker could have a sufficient reason (Schiffer
1993, 233–9; Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 290–4). Analogously,
without the appeal to a grammar, we cannot provide in terms of speaker-
meaning a sufficient condition for what is said by (i) sentences typically
uttered to perform non-literal acts of meaning, or (ii) sentences which say
104 MANUEL GARCı´A-CARPINTERO
so bizarre things that would not be uttered but to mean something different
from what they say.
What makes an account of linguistic meaning distinctively Gricean is
that it is to be given in terms of the concepts fundamentally used in the
Gricean account of speaker-meaning, of which the most distinctive one is
that of communicative intention. What this amounts to is that it is to be
given in terms of (self-supporting regularities involving) a specific form
of rational purposive activity, characteristic of persons. Now, only a small
finite subset of all logically possible utterances with a literal meaning in
a typical natural language occur under some such (even if tacit) rational
control. The Gricean project is thus doomed to failure if presented as by
Lewis (1975), explicitly rejecting that the appeal to speaker-meaning gives
any reason to ascribe to an actual language a grammar rather than another
determining the same possible language.
In more recent work, Lewis acknowledges this and appeals to “extra-
polation”. First, use, somehow determines meaning for the fragment of
language that is actually used. There are rules of syntax and semantics
that generate the right sentences with the right meanings within the used
fragment. These rules also generate other, longer sentences, with mean-
ings, outside the used fragment. Use determines some meanings, those
meanings determine the rules, and the rules determine the rest of the
meanings . . . . True, there are many grammars, but they are not on equal
terms. Some are ‘straight’ grammars; for example, any grammar that any
linguist would actually propose. Others are ‘bent’, or ‘gruesome’, gram-
mars” (Lewis 1992, 109–10). However, as Schiffer (1993, 236–9) argues,
this is still too extrinsic a way to determine the language spoken by a given
individual or community. For we can think of individuals who in fact speak
a finite language without grammar, or one for which they have internalized
(perhaps by explicit learning) a “bent” grammar, for which Lewis’ recipe
would produce the wrong extrapolation.
Loar (1981, 257–60) resorted at this point to a Chomskian psycho-
linguistic grammar internalized by the speaker to determine the actual
language he speaks. Lewis resists this move with considerations which
remind us of former arguments by him (see Lewis 1975) against positing
internally represented grammars as part of a Gricean account: “Maybe
there is a grammar somehow written into the brain. And conceivably it is a
bent grammar, so that the language it generates differs, somewhere outside
the used fragment, from the language we get by straight extrapolation.
Schiffer has asked: does straight extrapolation give the right answers even
then? I think so. If not, then whenever we resort to extrapolation to answer
questions of syntax and semantics, we are engaged in risky speculation
GRICEAN RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS 105
about the secret workings of the brain. That seems wrong” (Lewis 1992,
110).
What Lewis finds wrong, as Schiffer guesses, “is that if the inference
is risky, then language users will not know what language they are using.
If L is used by P only if some grammar of P is used in the processing
of utterances of L, and if no one is now in a position to go that deeply
into the brain, then how can the members of P know that it is L that they
are speaking?” (Schiffer 1993, 256, note 5). From our present perspective,
Schiffer is right in rejoining as follows: “But the most that follows from the
antecedent of this question is that members of P do not have knowledge
of the function L in a way that affords them a finite definition of it. They
may nevertheless know that, say, they speak Italian, where ‘Italian’ is a
rigid designator of the language they speak; or they may have all sort of
knowledge by description of the language they use, where the descriptions
under which they have their knowledge of L, do not give the wherewithal
to determine the grammar that in fact makes L the language they use”
(ibid. id.).
I take Schiffer’s suggestion on board. A potential source of resistance
to accepting it, lies in that it involves referring to the language whose
nature one is attempting to define in Gricean terms in the explicans of our
rational reconstruction, not only in the explicandum. People approaching
the Gricean project with the sort of reductionist goals we outlined earlier
will not be happy with this. Once the reductionist goals are abandoned,
however, there is no reason why we should not take Schiffer’s advice. We
will not get rid of references to and quantifications over genuinely social
entities in favor of merely psychological things; the reason is that there
are genuinely social entities, which, like any other genuine thing, are what
they are and nothing else.
For the purposes of this paper, the core of the view defended here on lin-
guistic meaning can be summarized as follows. Acts of meaning are those
acts characterized in Gricean explications of speaker-meaning; they are,
constitutively, occurrences rationally directed at producing certain mental
states through a process involving recognition of that goal. This is achieved
by the occurrence having a feature appropriate for its goal. Although this is
not necessary, the feature may consist in the occurrence being the result of
putting adequately together, devices conventionally used for making that
intention manifest in a language that the utterer speaks: semantic units,
including not only words and word-parts, but also other more structural
syntactic features. In that case, what act of meaning the speaker represents
himself as performing is determined by the conventional contribution made
to such acts in that language, by the semantic units he has put together.12
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The linguistic meaning of a unit is therefore its contribution to the acts of
meaning conventionally made by using it, and the linguistic meaning of an
utterance the resultant of the linguistic meaning of the units composing it.
I see this as the best confirmed philosophical hypothesis so far advanced.
2. TWO APPROACHES TO THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION
I will contrast now, by examining a few examples, a “Wittgensteinian”
approach very popular nowadays with the Gricean one I have outlined.
The approach appears in writings by Bezuidenhout, Carston, Recanati and
Schiffer, among others. I will focus for the most part on a concrete mani-
festation of this theoretical divide on which I am especially interested, the
proper treatment of referential uses of descriptions and descriptive uses of
indexicals. According to a view I share with other writers, both referential
uses of descriptions and descriptive uses of indexicals are pragmatic phe-
nomena, in the sketched Gricean sense. In themselves, those phenomena
are an insufficient basis for abandoning a semantic analysis of descrip-
tions and indexicals placing them in different semantic categories (those of
quantifiers and of singular terms, respectively). Like those other writers, I
would support this contention by following a well-known Gricean line of
argument involving the previous distinctions.
As a first approximation, we would say that the asymmetry in the se-
mantic behavior of definite descriptions, vis-à-vis that of indexicals lies in
that, while definite descriptions behave like quantifiers, indexicals behave
like singular designators. There are different ways of elaborating on the
nature of the intended difference. For present purposes, there is no need to
go into the details of the account of the asymmetry that I favor, which
I have presented elsewhere.13 The following outline should be enough.
Any token-indexical occurring in an utterance is associated with a certain
“token-reflexive” description; in the case of a token he of ‘he’, the token-
reflexive description is the male most salient when he is produced. This
description typically suffices to identify a particular object; the indexical’s
contribution to the semantically signified truth-condition is this individual.
The description merely fixes this contribution, being, in Recanati’s (1993)
terms, “truth-conditionally irrelevant”. I account for this “irrelevancy” by
treating the descriptive material as, in Grice’s terms, conventionally im-
plicated; in my own terms, as contributing in a specific way to what the
utterance conventionally takes for granted, or presupposes.14 On the other
hand, the contribution of a description, the F , to the truth-condition, lit-
erally signified by an utterance, is analogous to that of a quantificational
expression like every F or some F , mutatis mutandis. I should note that
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what is conventionally implicated is here taken to be part of the linguistic
meaning of an utterance, in accordance with the characterization of se-
mantics provided in the preceding section. The linguistic meaning of an
utterance includes not only the utterance’s truth-conditions; it includes
also its illocutionary force, because an illocutionary force is always (more
or less precisely) conventionally conveyed. On the present view, it in-
cludes also the utterance’s conventional implicatures. I will use ‘linguistic
content’ to refer to the linguistic meaning of an utterance abstracting its
force away, and ‘pragmatic content’ as contrasting phrase. In the ensuing
discussion, ‘linguistic content’ substitutes for the phrase more commonly
used, ‘what is said’. As I understand him, by using this term Grice was
referring to the conventionally signified truth-conditions; the dispute we
will examine goes beyond this, to embrace also the nature and role of the
conventionally conveyed descriptive material related to indexicals.15
I will not go any further into the details of the account, but I would
like to emphasize two aspects regarding which, although conforming to
the Gricean conception of the semantics-pragmatics distinction I have out-
lined, it differs from other views on it. In the first place, this proposal
rejects the common assumption that semantics only deals with features
associated with expression-types. It stands in opposition to these claims:
“linguistic knowledge concerns expression types, not tokens” (Bach 1987,
87); “semantics [. . . ] is concerned with linguistic types, not tokens. If a
token of an expression carries any information not encoded by the type of
which it is a token, that information is not linguistic information” (ibid.,
p. 5); “that a sentence is actually uttered is a pragmatic fact” (Bach, ma-
nuscript). In a token-reflexive account of context-dependence, the main
semantic properties (e.g., truth-conditional import) are assigned to tokens
(to be sure, relative to properties conventionally associated with the types
they instantiate); tokens also contribute to what the utterance convention-
ally presupposes, i.e., to constraints which the utterance places on the
background set of assumptions constituting what Stalnaker (1974) calls
‘the conversational common ground’.
Writers like Bach think of an actual language as a system of general
rules or facts, linking repeatable entities (types) with their repeatable lin-
guistic features. I see it as a set of actual and potential utterances, whose
relevant linguistic properties depend on such a system of general rules.
(And on whatever those rules depend in their turn, most importantly spe-
cific features of the psychology of language-users, first- or third-personally
accessible.) I do not wish to speculate on the theoretical motivation which
might be given for Bach’s view. Mine lies on the Gricean theoretical frame-
work outlined in the previous section. It is constitutive of a linguistic
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utterance that it is a conventional means to make certain communicat-
ive intentions manifest. In the case of indexicals, those communicative
intentions rely conventionally on features of the utterances themselves;
they take crucial advantage, in accordance with linguistic conventions,
of the concrete entities they are. This is why we should think of nat-
ural languages, in which this device of token-reflexivity is ubiquitous, as
constituted by the concrete acts themselves.
The second distinctive aspect I want to emphasize is this: the fact that,
conventionally, the use of a given expression leaves to pragmatic factors a
fuller determination of its contribution to what is meant, is compatible with
the utterance having a fully-fledged conventionally conveyed linguistic
content. For instance, the token-reflexive rule for ‘that’ establishes that
the truth-conditional import of any instance i of that type is the entity of a
given contextually determined sort which is demonstrated at the occasion
of the production of i. This assigns a full conventional content to utterances
of ‘that is a tree’, even though one somehow unspecific and relying on
context for a fuller pragmatic determination. A similar point can be made
about incomplete definite descriptions. A natural line for the Russellian
of a Reichenbachian persuasion to take is to say that, when a manifestly
incomplete description the F is successfully used in an utterance u of
which an instance i of the F is a part, additional token-reflexive descriptive
material is implicitly understood, which, together with that conveyed by
F provides the intended description. This conventionally understood, im-
plicit descriptive material can be given by means of a description like the
most salient F at the occasion when i is produced.
In terms of the useful distinctions made by Recanati in his contribution
to this symposium, “What Is Said”, these suggestions place me in essential
agreement with “Minimalism” on what is said, as based on what he calls
“the traditional picture”. There is one important difference, though. Re-
canati characterizes the traditional view as not conceiving of language as a
form of rational activity, more specifically as the form of rational activity
which Grice explicated as acts dependent on communicative intentions.
This, as should be obvious, is not the proper contrast between the view
I am defending and the one Recanati himself supports. The main reason
I have for characterizing the contribution of indexicals and incomplete
descriptions as suggested results from applying to them the hypothesis set
forth at the end of the previous section: i.e., that those characterizations
provide the best way of explicating the regular, conventional contribution
of those expressions to acts of meaning made by means of them. And, as I
was at pains to make clear in the previous section, that hypothesis makes
the linguistic meaning of a semantic unit dependent on psychological facts.
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The difference between us has rather to do with the kind of psychological
states on which, according to each view, semantic theories systematically
rely.
On the present view, semantic interpretation cannot deliver (as Recanati
suggests) “only semantic schemata”, precisely because no proper act of
meaning can involve only schemata. It is full propositions, with full truth-
conditions, that the speakers can inform about, enjoin others to make true,
and so on. For all Recanati says, by looking at what speakers do in a purely
conventional manner in the way I have suggested, we do find complete
conventionally meant propositions. It is true that, typically, when a speaker
utters a token i of ‘I’, he takes for granted that more identificatory informa-
tion is available in context than just producer of i: say, how he looks at that
time. But this purely linguistic piece of information is enough for uniquely
identifying somebody (in felicitous acts), and it is the only piece of in-
formation conventionally contributing to literal acts of meaning involving
tokens of ‘I’. My view is that speakers know this (unthematizedly), and
rely on their audiences sharing with them this knowledge to pick up from
context other pieces of identificatory information.
Similarly, it is true that when a speaker utters a token i of ‘that’, he takes
for granted that more information is available in context about the sort of
of entity intended than salient when i is produced. But, again, it is also
true that this piece of information is enough to identify uniquely a sort (in
felicitous acts),16 and it is a piece of information which we can take to be
conventionally contributing to literal acts of meaning involving tokens of
‘that’. One significant reason for thinking that a reference to a salient class
is conventionally implicit in pronominal uses of demonstratives like ‘that’
lies in the fact that, in contrast with indexicals like ‘he’ and ‘you’, those
demonstratives have also, conventionally, an adjectival use: ‘that tree’, etc.
Speakers unthematizedly know this, and rely on their audience’s sharing
with them this knowledge to pick up from context pieces of classificatory
information when not explicitly given by the utterance.
Let me briefly examine two more examples frequently discussed in the
literature, to give the flavor of the Gricean view I am endorsing. When a
speaker utters a token i of ‘have had’ (as in ‘I have had breakfast’), he
takes for granted that more information is available in context about the
past time interval to which he is referring than just that it is in the past with
respect to the time at which i is produced, and it is salient in the context of i.
This further information would determine a pragmatically communicated
content. But, again, this is conventional, and determines sufficiently the
relevant class in felicitous contexts; my view is that speakers know this
unthematizedly, and rely on this knowledge, for guiding their audiences in
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pragmatically obtaining from context more specific information about this
time interval. When a speaker utters a token i of ‘is raining’ (as in ‘it is
raining’), he takes for granted that more information is available in context
about the place he is referring to than that it is salient when the token i is
produced. But it is a conventional fact about the use of the present tense
with verbs meaning located events such as ‘to rain’ that the place referred
to is indicated in that way, as it were, by default, and speakers rely on their
audiences sharing with them this knowledge.
This view is close to Bach’s (1994) treatment of those cases that he
describes as (pragmatic) “expansion”, which include examples like ‘I have
had breakfast’. Cases like ‘it is raining’, however, of what he describes as
pragmatic “completion”, cannot, he thinks, receive a similar treatment. In
those cases, he claims, semantics alone does not provide a fully-fledged
linguistic content determining a truth-value; we have to rely for that on
pragmatic processes. I am suggesting that there is no relevant distinction
between the two cases; what Bach says regarding “expansion” applies also
to what he characterizes as “completion”. He overlooks this, I think, be-
cause he has an incorrect picture of how indexicals work to begin with.
Ultimately, the mistake might derive from his unmotivated assumption that
facts involving tokens are pragmatic.
Regarding what he judges as cases involving completion, Bach says
that “there is no theoretical basis for denying their semantic incomplete-
ness by inventing hidden syntactic slots that must be filled in order for
a complete proposition to be expressed“ (Bach, manuscript). As far as I
can see, Bach only supports this attribution of inventiveness to a proposal
like the present one with this reasoning: “indexical reference fixes the
interpretation of an element that occurs in the utterance . . . on the other
hand, the conceptual gaps in utterances of semantically underdeterminate
sentences do not correspond to anything in the sentences themselves, not
even to empty syntactic categories” (Bach 1994, 133). As we have seen,
semantic conventions associated with indexical types, when applied to
tokens, provide (in well-behaved contexts) those tokens with a referent and
also with a token-reflexive referent-fixer (which can be further enriched
pragmatically, and it is in fact typically so enriched). Now, the conventions
at stake are not only related to separate words; they are sometimes related,
e.g., to lexemes indicating time. I have suggested reasons to think that
analogous conventions are associated with lexical items like the verb ‘to
rain’. The main considerations here are along the lines of those I have
used for the claim that a relevant class is indicated when pronominal uses
of demonstratives like ‘this’ are involved. In the latter case, we have the
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fact of contrasting adjectival uses; in the former, contrasting uses in which
places are explicitly referred to, or quantified over.
Recanati says that in ascribing to expressions meanings like the ones
I have been canvassing we are philosophically cheating. I suppose that
this feeling is in part due to my reliance on a general notion of contextual
salience. Of course, much more empirical work should be done to clarify
what criteria of salience (or accessibility) are relied upon by language
users. However, I do not think this makes illegitimate the appeal to the
concept, because it seems clear that, no matter which the details are, lan-
guage users do rely (unthematizedly) on such a notion. The best policy
for showing that we are not cheating consists, I think, in providing a clear
philosophical rationale for the Gricean line. This is the project to which I
have been trying to contribute. The reasons for attributing to speakers the
forms of unthematized knowledge just illustrated are, ultimately, the reas-
ons we have for thinking that languages are constituted by conventional
regularities involving the rational activities explicated by Grice as cases of
speaker-meaning.
Let us thus go back to our main example. There are uses of indexicals
which are descriptive. Compare the following sentence found in a period-
ical (“How Many People Can the Earth Support?”, Joel E. Cohen, The New
York Review of Books, October 8, 1998, p. 31): ‘three quarters of a billion
people, more or less, were hungry yesterday, are hungry today, and will
be hungry tomorrow’. It is fair to assume that the author did not intend to
make a singular claim concerning the day when he produced the instanti-
ation of ‘today’ from which the one we happen to come across originated
(and the days before and after it). The reason is not that we, the audience,
lack any means of identifying that day with sufficient understanding; for
we have just done that. The reason is rather that the author is supposed
to speak with the authority of someone in a position to impart knowledge,
and he is also supposed to be willing to impart as much relevant knowledge
as he is in a position to give. Whatever his justification for this presumed
knowledge is, it is fair to assume that it is not justification specific for a
singular proposition about that day, but rather justification for a stronger,
universal claim about all the days in a certain period including the day
when he produced that token and any days at which other tokens originated
with that one might be encountered by a potential reader. It is perhaps
to make this clearer that he mentions three days (‘yesterday, today and
tomorrow’) instead of just one.
For the same reason, the speaker cannot be meaning a singular propos-
ition about the day when we come across an instance of ‘today’ originated
with the token he produced. In this case, it is correct to say that an ad-
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ditional reason is that he lacks any means of distinguishing the day in
question from any other at which an instance of ‘today’ originating in his
writing might be encountered. On the other hand, there must be some point
to his using singular terms, instead of just asserting the quantificational
claim he is in a position to make. It is thus fair to assume that he is not
making a singular claim, but a general descriptive one about the particular
day on which we have come across the token-indexicals originated with
his utterance. Given any instantiation of ‘today’ originated with his writ-
ing and encountered during a certain period, he is making a general claim
about the day when such instantiation is read, whatever that day is.
To account for descriptive uses of indexicals like this one, the defender
of the asymmetry would have recourse at this point to the Gricean explic-
ation of conversational implicatures (essentially involving a “derivation”
along the lines of the argument we have just produced), to support the
view that the fact that utterances like the one in our example express a
general descriptive proposition is a pragmatic one. He would also insist
that the utterance still has, even in this case, its literal, singular meaning,
in that the derivation of the pragmatic meaning takes at the very least as a
premise the assumption that the literal meaning has been expressed. Sim-
ilarly, there are cases, of which Donnellan provided famous examples, in
which descriptions appear to play a merely “reference-fixing” role for an
individual, which is the intended contribution to the expressed proposition.
The defender of the asymmetry will suggest, analogously, that this is also
a pragmatic phenomenon, and that, even in those cases, the literal, general
proposition is also semantically conveyed, because the assumption that it
has been expressed plays a crucial role in the derivation of the pragmatic
content.
The writers I am arguing with dispute this. They acknowledge that there
are straightforward cases of non-linguistic content – paradigmatically, par-
ticularized conversational implicatures. At dinner time, A suggests to go
to a restaurant; B retorts by uttering ‘I have had dinner’. This conveys that
B does not agree to go into the restaurant; the content of this speech-act,
that (say) A and B do not go into the restaurant, is a non-linguistic content
for everybody participating in the dispute – an implicated content, let us
say. Now, the Gricean line to trace the semantics-pragmatics distinction I
have been advocating so far contends that linguistic content goes only as
far as to characterize the period before that of the utterance during which
the speaker has had dinner as salient in the context of the utterance; the
Gricean view takes the content describing further this period as being, say,
of less than three hours, to be as non-linguistic as implicated contents.
It is this which the writers with which I am arguing dispute. They claim
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that linguistic content includes in this case the pragmatically obtained ma-
terial concerning the relative shortness of the signified time interval. The
same, they think, applies to referential uses of definite descriptions and
attributive uses of indexicals: the contents obviously meant by speakers
and understood by their audiences in these cases are according to them
straightforward cases of linguistic content; they are not, as the Gricean
takes them to be, implicated contents.
To have a coherent theory, therefore, those writers must have a criterion
for distinguishing those pragmatic features which are part of what they
consider linguistic content, from merely implicated contents. They have
offered two criteria, as far as I know. These criteria are invoked by them
in arguments against the Gricean view. The first criterion has been given
by Carston (1988). She claims that linguistic content is not logically en-
tailed by implicated content; i.e., that truly implicated contents cannot be
precisifications of linguistic contents, logically stronger than them. The
real basis for this principle, I guess, lies in what I take to be the main
consideration motivating these writers, to be discussed in the following
section. But it should be clear that the principle is unjustified, for there are
uncontroversial cases of implicatures where it fails to apply. Consider, e.g.,
Grice’s famous example of a generalized implicature, ‘I saw John with a
woman’, which typically conveys that I saw John with a woman different
from his wife, sister or mother.
The second criterion has been advanced by Recanati (1993): if a sen-
tence conveying an implicated content when uttered in a context is placed
under the scope of logical operators, the implicated content is not “in-
herited” by the new, longer sentence (in the context differing from the
previous one in that the utterance of the latter sentence replaces the other).
However, the contents on which the debate focuses are thus inherited; for
instance, the understood characterization of the salient interval as relatively
short is also there when instead of ‘I have had dinner’ we say ‘I have not
had dinner’, or, instead of ‘he has had dinner’, ‘if he has had dinner, it has
not been very much, for he is very hungry’. This criterion, however, fares
as poorly as Carston’s: uncontroversial cases of implicated contents are
also inherited. In another famous example by Grice, an utterance of ‘there
is a gas station around the corner’ implicates that there is gas available
around the corner. This implicated content is inherited in some longer
utterances: just consider ‘if there is a gas station around the corner, I do
not need to worry any more’; and ‘there is no gas station nearby’ can be
regarded as not falsified by the existence of a closed gas station around the
corner.
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Counterexamples are not by themselves sufficient to reject the criteria
offered by Carston and Recanati, for they might simply reject them; but
the counterexamples can be backed up with more theoretical support. The
problem with Carston’s and Recanati’s criteria is that an account of the
constitutive nature of conversational implicatures such as Grice’s does
not give them any basis; and they have not provided any real alternative
supporting their principles. Grice’s account characterizes implicatures as
acts of meaning in which the speaker exploits mutually known rational
principles guiding communication over and above the semantics of any
particular language, and mutually known knowledge of the world, together
with the linguistic meaning of his utterances, to convey by means of these
utterances a non-linguistic meaning. This account does not provide any
basis for the principles. Take Carston’s: Grice’s account suggests straight-
forward cases of implicatures which will typically violate it. (Consider
cases produced by exploiting the maxims of quantity, e.g., ironic under-
statement: ‘he is a bit short’, said of someone manifestly very short.)
Similarly, in opposition to Recanati’s principle, Grice’s constitutive ac-
count of pragmatic phenomena allows us to predict cases where the
implicated contents will be inherited, and cases where they will rather be
cancelled. Stalnaker (1974) has provided, inside the Gricean framework, a
pragmatic account of why presuppositions (both those having a semantic
origin and those having a purely pragmatic one) are inherited in certain
linguistic contexts, which will also do for implicated contents. This ac-
count explains why the conversational implicatures that the utterance of a
sentence can convey in a given context will be preserved when the sentence
is uttered instead as the antecedent of certain conditionals, etc, and why
they will be cancelled in other cases.17
What is ultimately in fact behind Carston’s and Recanati’s principles
is, I believe, the main consideration for the Wittgensteinian view, to which
I will turn presently. For instance, when Carston defends intuitively her
principle, she suggests this line of reasoning: if p is logically stronger
than q, an utterance cannot convey the two contents; for language users
will not have any real application for the weaker content, the stronger
being appropriate for anything for which they might need the weaker. An
argument along these lines, however, can only justify the following: if p
is logically stronger that q, language users will only pay attention to, or
keep consciously in mind the former and not the latter. Inferring further
from what ordinary speakers are typically conscious of, to the correct ac-
count of linguistic meaning, is precisely the fallacy I am most interested in
exposing.
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As a final consideration before I address this fallacy, let me mention
that the cancellability of the contents which the Gricean proposal counts
as pragmatic, in the same sort of circumstances in which uncontroversial
cases of implicated contents are cancelled, also favors the Gricean view.
(‘I have not had breakfast. Not just recently: I decided quite some time ago
already not to eat anything until six hours after I get up.’) In reply to this,
Bezuidenhout (1997a, 203) objects that a context in which someone utters
‘I have not had breakfast’ followed by ‘Not just recently . . . ’ is a different
context from one in which one just utters ‘I have not had breakfast’. This
is true, but beside the point. Straightforward cases of conversational im-
plicatures are cancellable – not just for the Gricean, for everybody in the
debate. To pay due attention to Bezuidenhout’s correct point, we should be
careful about what cancellation involves. Here is a reasonable suggestion.
We have to consider a context which differs from the actual one only in
that, instead of the utterance p giving rise to the alleged implicature q,
what is uttered is rather something like: p, but not q. In such an alternat-
ive context, the speaker will not be contradicting himself, but cancelling
the implicated content q. Contents counted as pragmatic by our Gricean
proposal (including the cases under dispute) are cancellable under this
characterization.
Bezuidenhout (1997a, 203) also repeats a point first argued by Walker
(1975) in reaction to Grice’s strategy. The point is that the calculability
and cancellability of a given content is compatible with that content being
linguistic. The expression whose semantics we are discussing might well
be linguistically ambiguous. If so, the allegedly pragmatic meaning will be
derived in context on the basis of conversational maxims; and, of course,
it will be cancellable without contradiction. At this point, the Gricean will
have recourse to additional criteria, also suggested by his constitutive char-
acterization of the semantics/pragmatics distinction. A very important one
is Kripke’s (1977). Suppose that expression A has, uncontroversially, the
conventional meaning M, and that it is also frequently used with meaning
N . If it is reasonable to think that, even in a language whose semantics
has been explicitly stipulated to be such that A has only meaning M, the
expression will frequently acquire meaningN on the basis of the pragmatic
mechanisms described by Grice, then it is to that extent reasonable to think
that expression A has in our language just meaning M instead of being
ambiguous. This sort of consideration can also be used in support of the
Gricean viewpoint in the cases I have been canvassing.
In sum, the Gricean proposal presented in the previous section, whose
application we have been illustrating, provides a theoretically well-
motivated distinction between pragmatic and semantic facts. Carston
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(1988) criticizes as unmotivated a “Linguistic Direction Principle”, with
effects analogous to those of our Gricean proposal, which counts as part
of linguistic meaning only what is signified by some linguistic feature of
the utterance. I think I have at least sketched such a motivation, dependent
on the Gricean constitutive account of the nature of linguistic meaning.
What we have seen so far is that the writers who reject the Gricean pro-
posal do not have an alternative constitutive account, capable of tracing
a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between what they want to consider as
aspects of linguistic content, and what they recognize as merely implicated
contents. I will now discuss the basic assumptions which motivate their
views.
3. THE WITTGENSTEINIAN MASTER ARGUMENT
In this final section, I will pursue my main critical goal: to expose what I
take to be the main line of argument used by the Wittgensteinians. We will
find in the criticisms they make of the Gricean line a common presumption:
that semantic facts are those, and only those, which can easily become
objects of conscious, explicit, occurrent judgments made by competent
users of the language. I think that this is an implausible contention, from
which no theoretically reasonable characterization of the facts is to follow.
Let us consider a few examples of the Wittgensteinian master argument.
Schiffer (1995) has argued for a symmetric treatment of indexicals and
descriptions by focusing on referential uses of incomplete descriptions.
The crucial move of Schiffer’s argument appears in the following text:
“[. . . ] the two cases [indexicals and descriptions] have exact psycholo-
gical parity with respect to those psychological facts on which the relevant
speaker meaning would have to supervene. If you ask the speaker what
she meant in uttering “The guy is drunk”, you will not get a report that
favours the description theory: the speaker will almost certainly offer up
an object-dependent proposition involving Pergola, the intended referent
of her utterance of “the guy”. If a theorist is to be justified in discover-
ing a [. . . ] description-theoretic act of meaning in the utterance of “The
guy is drunk”, it will have to be on the basis of the fact that the speaker
intended it to be mutual knowledge between her and her audience that
certain definite descriptions applied to Pergola, and that certain parts of
these were essential to the communicative act, in that the speaker would
not have uttered her sentence if she had thought those descriptions were
not mutually known to be instantiated. If we are warranted in ascribing
an indeterminate description-theoretic act of meaning to the speaker when
she utters “The guy is drunk”, then it will have to be solely on the basis
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of these psychological facts. But these very same facts are also obtained
when the speaker utters “He is drunk”. For example, in neither case would
the speaker have produced her utterance if she had not thought that just one
man was staggering up to the podium to give a talk. Moreover, these psy-
chological facts pertaining to contextually-relevant definite descriptions
apply to any utterance of an indexical-containing sentence, and I shall
assume that this is clear to you on reflection” (Op. cit., 120).
Let us grant that, if we ask the ordinary speaker what he has in mind
when he produces two contrasting utterances, one involving an indexical
and another an incomplete description referentially used, no asymmetry
will be revealed from his answers. In particular, his answers will not mani-
fest anything corresponding to the contrast between a Gricean derivation
of the allegedly non-literal singular meaning of the descriptive utterance,
and the Gricean explication of the literal singular meaning of the indexical
utterance. The important point is to notice that Schiffer presumes that any
confirmation or disconfirmation for a claim about the semantic properties
of expressions, has to be found at the level of that kind of psychological
fact: those which can be established by asking the ordinary speaker.
Recanati (1993) provides a second example. He is not against the se-
mantic asymmetry of indexicals and definite descriptions; however, he
would dispute the pragmatic account of referential uses of descriptions
which I have alluded to, and I am interested in looking at an important part
of his argument. His analysis involves assimilating the distinction between
general and referential uses of descriptions to what he calls “metonymical
transfer”. Imagine that two car-fans, A and B, who mutually know each
other to be car lovers, are discussing the merits of two candidates for a
given job. They do not know the candidates’ names, but they know (that the
other knows, and so on) the rather interesting cars (of different makes) the
candidates use. In this context, A says: ‘I believe that the Porsche is more
considerate and will be a better colleague’. It is clear that ‘the Porsche’
refers here to one of the candidates, and not to a car or car-brand. This
is a case that Recanati calls “metonymical transfer”; according to him,
referential uses of descriptions are derived in this manner from attributive
uses.
Now, the Gricean should not feel threatened by the assimilation of gen-
eral and referential uses of descriptions, respectively, to the conventional
use of ‘the Porsche’ to refer to a car-brand and to its use in the example to
refer to a car-owner; for he would be prepared to count the latter also as a
pragmatic phenomenon of non-literal meaning. Recanati would reject this
suggestion, by appealing to a certain “availability principle”: “In deciding
whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part
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of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we
should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter”
(Recanati 1993, 248). The application Recanati makes of this involves
a presumption, similar to the one we found in Schiffer’s argument. If a
Gricean implicature analysis of the “Porsche” example is to be rejected
on the basis of this principle, for instance, it is because ordinary speak-
ers do not have the intuition that a literal meaning, involving the absurd
attribution of human properties to a car or car-brand, is at all involved in
the interpretation of A’s sentence: “it does not seem that the speaker says
something absurd in order to convey something different” (Recanati 1993,
264; see also the discussion in pp. 246–51). As in Schiffer’s case, this use
of the principle involves the presumption that confirmation or disconfirm-
ation for proposals about the semantic properties of expressions should
be found at the level of the easily available conscious, explicit, occurrent
thoughts of ordinary speakers. This is almost explicit in Recanati’s con-
tribution to this symposium, when he characterizes his “maximalist” view
as contending that the input for the derivation of pragmatic implicatures
(i.e., the output of semantics) “is consciously available”. It is clear that he
means consciously available to ordinary speakers, i.e., available without
recourse to the sort of theorizing characteristic of philosophical semantics.
A rather startling example of the kind of questionable psychologizing
which I am discussing, is furnished by yet another defendent of an ap-
proach like Recanati’s, Ramachandran (1996). If a quantificational account
of a referential utterance of ‘the table is broken’ were correct, he suggests,
we should feel “a tension . . . . Intuitively, what is literally asserted is a
purely general proposition where no specific table is mentioned, whereas
what is conveyed is a proposition that does concern a specific table”
(Ramachandran 1996, 378). We are supposed to subscribe to an account
like Recanati’s so as to explain that “Description sentences and sentences
involving names or demonstratives are similar in that there seems to be
nothing wrong or improper about using them in certain contexts, to con-
vey singular (object-dependent) propositions” (ibid., 383). However, the
fact that our conscious experiences are as Ramachandran indicates, that
we do not “feel” any “tension” when confronted with referential uses of
incomplete descriptions, is irrelevant for the debate: it is compatible with
the correctness of both accounts, for they should not be understood as
addressing the explanation of those facts.
Another example is provided by Bezuidenhout (1997b), criticizing the
view that descriptive interpretations of indexicals like the one exemplified
above (‘three quarters of a billion people, more or less, were hungry yester-
day, are hungry today, and will be hungry tomorrow’) are non-literal with
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the following argument: “But it is rather implausible to say that in this
case the listener first comes to think of the referent in an identifying way
[in Bezuidenhout’s theory, this corresponds to “understanding a singular
proposition”], and then retreats to thinking of the referent in a merely
criterial way [in Bezuidenhout’s theory, this corresponds to “understand-
ing a general descriptive proposition”]. I would argue that it is precisely
because the listener is unable to think of the referent in an identifying way
in the context [. . . ] that the listener understands the speaker to have used
the indexical attributively” (Bezuidenhout 1997b, 401). Once again, we
could grant that the ordinary speaker does not entertain the idea that the
speaker is intending a singular proposition. What I want to highlight is the
presumption that, because the alleged literal meaning does not enter the
conscious experience of ordinary speakers when interpreting the sentence,
a Gricean account is inadequate.
The final example is provided by Nunberg (1993), who offers two reas-
ons against treating as non-linguistic descriptive uses of indexicals. The
first is that “sentences containing descriptive uses of indexicals may be
incoherent if the indexicals are interpreted as making singular references”.
The examples he considers include ‘I am traditionally allowed to order
whatever I like for my last meal’, ‘tomorrow is always the biggest party
night of the year’. He says: “the adverbs usually and always must be un-
derstood as involving quantification over instances, but these readings are
not possible if the subjects of the sentences are interpreted as referring to
individuals or particular times. So it is hard to see what coherent ‘literal’
interpretations we could assign to these utterances” (Nunberg 1993, 32).
What justifies, however, the assumption that a Gricean derivation of a non-
linguistic content must start from a coherent one? Well on the contrary;
a good reason to trigger the derivation is that the literal, secondary in-
terpretation is “incoherent”; the hypothesis that the speaker is abiding by
the conversational maxims, together with this first blush blatant violation
of the first maxim of quality, then takes the audience (as indeed intended
by the speaker) to the non-literal, primary one. ‘Bill is not himself today’
(which will be interpreted as non-literally meaning that today Bill lacks
some of the attributes that characterize him) is a good example of this.
Grice contemplated these cases, as potential explanations of metaphors;
compare his example ‘you are the cream of my coffee’ which, literally
taken, involves “categorial falsity” (Grice 1975, 34).18
It is puzzling that Nunberg thinks that the Gricean account requires the
literal interpretation to be “coherent”. It is equally puzzling that Recanati,
who on behalf of his own view replies to Nunberg along the previous lines,
agrees with Nunberg’s criticism when applied to the Gricean. In a revealing
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passage, Recanati justifies in this way the puzzling assumption he thereby
shares with Nunberg: “In [the Gricean] framework, the proposition liter-
ally expressed, viz. the (absurd) proposition that the speaker – a particular
person – is usually allowed to order his last meal, would have to be some-
how entertained in the process of interpreting [‘I am traditionally allowed
to order whatever I like for my last meal’]. I agree with Nunberg that
this consequence is unwelcome” (Recanati 1993, 321). Recanati’s rather
indeterminate notion of “somehow entertaining” a proposition has to be
interpreted so that this is “unwelcome” when the proposition is “absurd”.
An interpretation compatible with this which comes to mind, and which
the text at least allows, is the following: in its literal meaning, the sentence
has to express a proposition regarding what a thinker may rationally adopt
the propositional attitudes commesurate with the illocutionary point of the
type of speech act involved: belief, if we are considering an assertion,
intention, if an order or request is at stake, etc.
This view might have been motivated by the assumption that the
Gricean theoretical claims should have clear-cut counterparts in conscious
processes immediately accessible to speakers on reflection. The Gricean
view, on this interpretation, involves the notion that the audience is inten-
ded, firstly, to consciously interpret the sentence as if it had been meant
with its literal meaning in an ordinary way, and then to initiate a conscious
derivation. It should be clear that this saddles the Gricean with a view that
he has no need to hold. The Gricean process of deriving an implicature can
be triggered by the merely tacit realization that, if conventional rules are
applied, in context, to the instantiated sentence, a communicative intention
blatantly flouting the maxims is to be attributed to the speaker; and I do
not see any reason whatsoever why the expression of an “absurd propos-
ition” (whose assertability, etc., no rational being would for one moment
consciously “entertain”) is not to be taken as a particular case of this.
From the present viewpoint, all these writers presuppose that the se-
mantic project is other than it in fact is. Let me avail myself to the concept
of a conscious, explicit, occurrent thought at this point (a CEO-thought
henceforth). Perhaps one or two of the notions I use here can be explic-
ated in terms of the others, but we do not need to care about that for
our purposes. CEO-thoughts are, for instance, the perceptual judgment we
make about the distribution of observable properties, events and objects in
the scene before our senses when we take our sensory experience at face
value; judgements about the past made by taking at face value our appar-
ent episodic memories; judgments or intentions which we make by fully
endorsing utterances in our language, assertive or prescriptive; reasonings
which we make by carefully going through their steps, as expressed by
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utterances in our language. The above examples evidently presuppose that,
for a semantic proposal to be correct, the propositional attitudes it posits
should be easily available to ordinary users of the target expressions, in the
form of some of their CEO-thoughts.
Now, I should say straight away that I sympathize to a certain extent
with the attraction to assumptions, such as Recanati’s Availability Prin-
ciple. The Gricean picture of language use emphasizes that it is a rational
process. Merely “subpersonal-level” states cannot account for this. There
is another view of semantic interpretation, alternative to Recanati’s, which
avoids any reliance on the sort of first-personal psychological states in-
volved in speaker-meaning. On this view, semantic facts depend at most,
on functional or neurological (“subpersonal”) states, only empirically
available to the subjects instantiating them. They do not depend on the kind
of psychological state distinctive of persons, available in a privileged, non-
empirical way to their subjects. On the view Recanati defends, semantic
facts do depend on personal-level psychological states, but only on the
most superficial, most easily available. The proposal I am making, tries to
navigate a middle course between the Scylla of the subpersonal view, and
the Charibdis of the surface-psychological view, defended by Recanati and
others.
This is why we should be careful when we reply to the Wittgensteinian
master argument, on behalf of the Gricean view, that the posited mental
processes are only supposed to be “tacit” or “implicit”. Thus, for in-
stance, Evans and McDowell (1976, xix–xxiii) complain that the Gricean
inferentialist account of meaning and understanding is at odds with the
phenomenology of those activities, as much as a traditional inferentialist
account of perception is at odds with the phenomenology of that activity.
Loar (1981, 248–52) replies that the allegation is correct, but beside the
point, in that “the subsidiary ‘intentions’ of Grice’s and Schiffer’s accounts
can be realistically acknowledged in the form of operative implicit expect-
ations without which the utterance would not have occurred” (ibid., 251),
while on the part of the hearer the account can make do with an “im-
plicit reasoning” constituted by “implicit beliefs such that without them
the hearer would not ascribe the meaning he does ascribe” (ibid., 252).
In a similar vein, Lewis writes: “An action may be rational, and may be
explained by the agent’s beliefs and desires, even though that action was
done by habit, and the agent gave no thought to the beliefs and desires
which were his reason for acting. A habit may be under the agent’s rational
control in this sense: if that habit ever ceased to serve the agent’s desires
according to his beliefs, it would at once be overriden and corrected by
conscious reasoning. Action done by a habit of this sort is both habitual
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and rational. Likewise for habits of believing. Our normal use of language
is rational, since it is under rational control” (Lewis 1975, 181).
The Gricean view presented in the first section suggests that, while
these replies are correct as far as they go, as understood by Loar and
Lewis they do not go far enough. A way to support an ascription of tacit
knowledge is by finding a system of tacit knowledge in the Chomskian
sense, as elaborated by Evans (1985) and Davies (1987). The important
characteristic of a Chomskian system of tacit knowledge is that we can
only be justified in ascribing it on the basis of empirical evidence: psy-
cholinguistic data about processing time, priming, etc., about patterns of
acquisition and lost of the ability, neurological data, and so on. We can
be justified in claiming that a system known in those ways, is a system
of tacit beliefs, if the causal processes constituting the system, mirror the
processes of someone who had the relevant beliefs in an explicit form.
Let us use ‘phrase’, as before, to refer to any proper part of an utter-
ance which plays a crucial role in a compositional determination of the
literal meaning of the utterance; phrases can be words instantiated in the
utterance, or more abstract structural traits also with a semantic import.
The main problem confronting us in our attempt to provide a sufficient
reply to the Wittgensteinian master arguments, concerns the expression-
meaning of phrases. We have to show that the sort of psychological fact
to which the writers I have quoted appeal, is semantically irrelevant. The
literal meaning of expressions have to be derived by taking seriously the
fact that language is a rational activity whose point is that articulated in
Gricean explications of speaker-meaning. As suggested in the first section,
we have to look at the pattern shown in the conventional use of the ex-
pressions whose semantics we want to comprehend, and not to the CEO of
ordinary speakers. Now, when it comes to this problem, writers like Lewis
and Loar feel that such an appeal to unthematized knowledge on behalf of
the Gricean program cannot be made. What I contend is that the sort of
appeal to unthematized knowledge they are prepared to make at the level
of whole utterances should and can be made also at the level of phrases.
Lewis and Loar are prepared to invoke unthematized knowledge cor-
responding to the states posited in Gricean explications at the level of
utterance-meaning, which in their view exists and suffices for the cor-
rectness of attributions of those rational states. They both acknowledge a
different, Chomskian sense of tacit knowledge, relative to which speakers
might also be said to have tacit knowledge at the level of phrase-meaning
somehow consistent with Gricean ascriptions at that level. But they would
correctly reject taking the existence of Chomskian tacit knowledge as suf-
ficient for ascribing to speakers Gricean tacit knowledge at the level of
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phrase-meaning: “nothing in the Gricean framework requires a hearer to
know a semantic theory of the speaker’s language in any ordinary sense
of ‘know’. What is perhaps not implausible is that knowing a language
involves the capacity to know of each sentence (within limits) what its
semantic properties are” (Loar 1981, 252). “The common man . . . need
only have suitable particular expectations about how [his fellows] might
act, and how they might form beliefs, in various situations. He can tell
whether any actual or hypothetical particular action or belief-formation on
their part is compatible with his expectations” (Lewis 1975, 180).
Lewis and Loar are right that the existence of Chomskian tacit know-
ledge is not sufficient to justify attributions of Gricean tacit knowledge of
phrase-meaning; but, as we have seen in the first section, they are wrong
in thinking that the vindication of the Gricean program does not need
such an attribution in a properly justified form. What makes an account
of linguistic meaning distinctively Gricean is that it is given in terms of
speaker-meaning. What this amounts to is that it is given in terms of
personal-level (as opposed to merely subpersonal-level) states: in terms
of (self-supporting regularities involving) the rational purposive mental
activity characteristic of human beings. Now, only a small finite subset of
all logically possible utterances with a literal meaning in a typical natural
language occur under some such (even if tacit) rational control; and, as we
have seen, some utterances are consistently produced with what we want to
count as a non-linguistic meaning. The Gricean project is doomed unless
the appeal to knowledge of structure can be justified inside it.
What is needed is an appeal to unthematized knowledge of the con-
ventional contribution of phrases, to acts of meaning, not just to tacit
knowledge of the Chomskian variety. Such knowledge is constituted by
personal-level psychological states, like those easily accessible in the form
of CEO-thoughts, and unlike the Chomskian states of tacit knowledge; but,
like the latter, it is only available after reflection heuristically of a scientific
character, taking as data intuitions about the evaluation of utterances relat-
ive to several circumstances. As I said, I share with Recanati and others the
view that some form of “first-personal availability” is thus required. How-
ever, the one attainable through the process of ordinary scientific-semantic
theorizing is in my view quite enough. It also involves psychological pro-
cesses, although not the sort of psychological process on which Recanati et
al. focus: it requires us to evaluate our intuitions regarding the satisfaction
or otherwise, of hypothesized truth-conditions of utterances, including the
relevant expressions under different conceivable situations. I think that,
ultimately, this is the source of the trouble. The writers whose views I have
been discussing concentrate on, as it were, local psychological matters: the
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semantic intuitions of competent speakers about concrete utterances. The
Gricean picture encourages us to focus on more global issues: semantic
intuitions of competent speakers concerning the systematic contribution of
semantic units to different utterances in different contexts.
The account of the asymmetric semantics of descriptions and indexicals
outlined before, would be validated by research which, looking for con-
ventional regularities in use, took into account a sufficiently wide range
of uses of those expressions. For, on the Gricean view, to get a proper
account of the semantics of descriptions and indexicals what we have to
do is to look for the simplest way of accounting for the contribution of
those expressions to the utterances in which they regularly appear, along
the Gricean guidelines described; i.e., on the assumption that they are
systematically contributing to the form of rational activity explicated in
Gricean accounts of speaker-meaning. This kind of research would high-
light how infrequent descriptive uses of indexicals are, how indexicals are
systematically used to make singular acts of meaning in a wide variety of
linguistic contexts. It would also highlight the extent to which descriptions,
even incomplete descriptions, are systematically used to make quantific-
ational acts of meaning. A highly relevant argument would be the one
that Kripke (1977) made popular, consisting in imagining whether uses,
whose conventionality is in question, would equally arise in a language
in which expressions had been explicitly stipulated to have the allegedly
literal meaning.
I should stress that I am not denying the relevance of empirical, sub-
personal facts for the determination of the semantics of a given language.
On the contrary, I think that many fine-grained semantic facts can only be
adjudicated on that basis; I am thinking, for instance, of facts about binding
constraints. I am only arguing for the existence of personal-level facts,
particularly facts concerning the not so fine-grained semantic structure of
utterances, which are not easily available to ordinary speakers, and for their
important role in semantic theorizing. Here the considerations of the first
section are relevant. The Gricean is entitled to attribute states of unthemat-
ized knowledge concerning the linguistic meaning of phrases to ordinary
speakers only if he abandons reductionist goals. It is not implausible to
ascribe to ordinary speakers propositional attitudes about the meaning of
phrases and how they contribute to the meaning of utterances, if we are
entitled to use in characterizing them explicit references to the language
which they use: “expression X means M in the language that I speak”.
The main reason to ascribe to ordinary speakers personal-level unthem-
atized knowledge of the grammar of their language is methodological.
We take pretheoretically to be a fact about language use, that literal use
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of language is a form of rational activity, whose rationality reaches the
conventional use of phrases; and, unless we have good reasons not to
do so, our theories should integrate pretheoretical beliefs. One way in
which we can bring this pretheoretical belief to the surface, is by reflecting
on cases in which the rational expectations which account for why cer-
tain phrases are used, are not satisfied. There are well-known examples
involving indexicals which we could mention for illustrative purposes.
Consider an utterance of ‘that is a picture of one of the greatest philo-
sophers of the twentieth century’ made – as in a well known example by
Kaplan – while pointing without turning and looking to the place on a
wall which has been long occupied by a picture of Carnap, although, un-
beknownst to the speaker, someone has replaced Carnap’s picture with one
of Spiro Agnew. It seems accurate to say that, in cases like this, there are
two sets of referential intentions which, against the speaker’s reasonable
assumptions, come apart. There are his ultimate intention of referring to
a picture with certain observable features which he believes to be on the
wall and has been long there. As a competent user of English, the speaker
also makes clear his intention to refer to the picture made salient by his
demonstration, while uttering the relevant token of ‘that’; this is for him
an ancillary intention subserving the former. Typically, the two sorts of in-
tentions are present, even if we only notice them when, as in this case, they
come apart. It is considerations such as these, which support the Gricean
view that the conventional use of phrases and syntactic features is a form of
rational activity. Competent speakers will acknowledge the mistake, with
respect to a situation like the one we have described, and they will do it
systematically, with respect to the demonstrative phrase, no matter what
the other elements of the utterance are. The mistake, it seems to me, is the
one we have articulated. To characterize it in those normative terms pre-
supposes that speakers know that tokens of ‘that picture’ are conventionally
used to refer to the most salient picture when the token is produced.
Alternative views do not provide a reasonable picture of these intu-
itions concerning language use. The main alternative in the literature, is
to leave grammar to be determined by just what Chomskian grammar
speakers have internalized: “For suppose there prevails in P a practice
of meaning in L and that members of P are able to process utterances
in L because their language processing involves an internally represented
grammar ofL. Intuitively, this would count as their using L, whether or not
their processing of utterances of L also relied on the [Gricean]-required
propositional attitudes. We can imagine people whose processing ofL sen-
tences uses an internally represented grammar of L, but who do not make
the supersophisticated [Gricean]-required inferences. Perhaps these people
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are so “programmed” that upon hearing an utterance of S, they believe
straightway that the speaker meant p, when L(S) = p, unless that belief
is defeated in one or another ways (e.g., by a further belief that the speaker
was speaking metaphorically)” (Schiffer 1993, 242).19 Later Schiffer even
rejects the Chomskian requirement of an internally represented grammar,
on the basis of his Harvey-example (Schiffer 1987, ch. 7), which suggest
that we could even make do with less. I cannot see how a view such as this
can account for the intuitive diagnosis of examples like the one discussed
in the preceding paragraph.
This new alternative to the Gricean view also has naturalistic overtones.
The Gricean view contends that using and comprehending language is a
form of rational activity. It is usually unthematized; but it is still an activity
“under rational control” (to use Lewis’ phrase), and this applies to struc-
tural matters, to matters having to do with how utterances express what
the speaker means on the basis of its words and syntax. The alternative is
to think of this as a merely natural process, something that happens to us
without also constituting a form of rational activity. I say “merely” natural,
because, I want to emphasize, for the Gricean the process is also natural;
it might well be realized by a Chomskian system of linguistic competence,
and as I said there in fact are good reasons to think so. The issue is whether
or not it is merely natural.
Appreciating what is at stake is the extent to which linguistic activity
is “under rational control”, Laurence (1996) devotes his main argument
to questioning the following consequence he derives from the Gricean
view: “Since language, on this view, is a rather direct reflection of general
abilities to reason about one’s own mental states and the mental states of
one’s conspecifics, we should expect the ability to use language to correl-
ate strongly with these general capacities” (ibid., 286). He then provides
as counterexamples, cases of subjects without too much “general intelli-
gence” but with strong “linguistic abilities”, and viceversa. “If language
were a direct reflection of general abilities to reason about one’s own
mental states and the mental states of others, we should expect the ability
to use language to correlate strongly with these general communicative
capacities. We would not expect radical discontinuities between linguistic
and nonlinguistic use of what is physically the same symbol. The fact that
it does not correlate and that such discontinuities exist, suggests that the
ability to speak a language is not simply a reflection of general com-
municative or intellectual ability” (ibid., 290–1). Perhaps this provides
an empirical case against attempts to reductively account for knowledge
of language in terms of “general abilities to reason”. The present non-
reductionist view requires reflective capacities, and thus those general
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abilities; but it is compatible with knowledge of language being dependent
on a “domain-specific” cognitive module, and thus with the absence of
correlation Laurence indicates.20
The main argument for the Gricean taxonomy is thus, that it provides
the best account of the facts involving a lesser departure, from what we
already take ourselves to know. I have suggested some reasons for thinking
that there is more in the Gricean view than mere intellectualist prejudices.
Freed from some aspects which do not seem to be essential to it, the
traditional Gricean view regarding the pragmatic/semantic distinction is
in a better shape than critics think. To the extent, then, that a form of
the Gricean view like the one we have outlined here is well-supported,
we can see the irrelevancy of the Wittgensteinian main consideration. As
Grice insisted, the fact that meaning is ultimately use, should not lead us
to confuse aspects of use which involve the conventional deployment of
words and syntax for the sort of rational purpose captured in the Gricean
accounts of speaker-meaning, with merely non-literal uses.
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1 Neale (1992), however, offers a contrary estimate. (Later I will raise some doubts on its
accuracy on aspects which I deem fundamental to the Gricean perspective.)
2 Unlike tacit knowledge in the sense of Evans (1985) and Davies (1987), unthematized
knowledge is meant to be first-personal – accessible by reflection to its subject. Unlike
ordinary explicit knowledge, it is meant to be accessible only through a theoretically-driven
abductive process whose “empirical” basis lies in semantic intuitions.
3 Both distinctions, I will assume, come to much of the same.
4 Considerations based on factors like conservativeness, simplicity, integration of know-
ledge and so on. Searle (1969, 55) makes this point.
5 Millikan, for instance, “defines” conventions as follows: “To be thought of as conven-
tional, a reproduced pattern must be perceived as proliferated, due, in part, to the weight of
precedent, not to its intrinsically superior capacity to produce a desired result, or due, say,
to ignorance of any alternatives” (p. 166). This vague characterization does not have many
claims to having attained the normative goal of a philosophical explication. It raises all sort
of questions, which the paper does not answer: ‘Thought of’, by whom? How sensibly?
Must the required reproduction of patterns have a psychological explication? Is a merely
biological explanation sufficient, or even just a physical one? In what respects (physical,
biological, psychological, etc.) are “precedents” supposed to have “weight”? These doubts
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aside, the definition does suggest that there is no more to say about conventions than that
they are regularities having a historical, but contingent explanation. Unless this is clarified
further, however, digestion will turn out to be a convention. The main question for me is
whether such a clarification will not in the end entail that conventions are distinctively
constituted by actions having as their rational foundations certain preferences, together
with expectations of conformity by others.
6 Ultimately, Schiffer’s views might have been in agreement with this; for in his account of
explicit performatives (pp. 104–10), he contends that they are assertoric “in logical form”,
but they are not uttered with their “full conventional force”. The import of this is unclear
to me.
7 This weak form of ascribing conceptual priority to speaker-meaning with respect to
expression-meaning suffices to support Strawson (1964) Gricean criticism of Austin’s
(1962) account of illocutionary force. Strawson’s point was that some illocutionary acts –
including some with claims to be counted as paradigm cases like informing and enjoining
– can be performed without using a conventional device for it. To subscribe this contention
we only need the priority claim embodied in contentions (i)–(ii).
8 The main theses of the paper are thus very much along the lines of the middle way
defended by Davies (forthcoming). Incidentally, the realization of the unsurmountable
difficulties which the folk-psychological variety of reductionism confronts, together with
the persistence of the reductionist goals, might perhaps account for the later development
of Schiffer’s views.
9 See, for instance, Schiffer 1987, 245–7, and Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 290–
4, for a summary of usual criticisms. It is fair to assume that the later authors take the
objections they mention as the most damaging. The fact that all of them have proper
responses inside the present framework, invalidates their claim that the Gricean research
programme is a degenerating one.
10 In fact, I think this follows from a deeper metaphysical fact about event-individuation:
whenever we mention events in explanations, it is events-as-instantiating-relevant-
properties that we are mentioning.
11 Similar considerations dispose of an objection by Schiffer to a view close to the one I
am propounding here, that – given such a Gricean account – it would (absurdly) not be
possible for a speaker to mean what we would take him to mean by “writing the sentence
‘I cannot write a sentence that contains more than three words (Schiffer 1987, 261).
12 Blackburn voices another common objection to Gricean accounts when he argues: “If I
have to gesture or mime or otherwise invent a performance I must hope that you appreciate
why I am doing it. But once we have methods of communicating into which we have been
trained, perhaps I need not care at all if you recognize my intention in uttering. It would
be enough if you heard my words, because you will have been trained to take them in
a certain way, and so taking them, you will understand me” (Blackburn 1984, 113). The
present view is that Blackburn is not setting up any genuine alternative here. For the point
of the training is precisely that the hearer appreciates why the speaker is acting as he is;
and, if the speaker is not irrational, he must care (albeit not explicitly) that it be recognized.
13 See García-Carpintero (1998) for more detail. The asymmetry is further developed in
my “The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals”, unpublished manuscript
14 I develop this idea in García-Carpintero (forthcoming).
15 For instance, although I take some descriptive material to be part of the linguistic content
of an utterance of ‘he is angry’, I disagree with Bezuidenhout’s (1996) contention that
descriptive material is part of what is said – which she attempts to sustain in part by
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appealing to the Wittgensteinian line I am going to oppose. Regarding the truth conditions
of such utterances, I take a straightforward Direct Reference view.
16 What if the context is not felicitous, and there is no unique salient individual? For the
related case of the domain of discourse, Gauker (1997) relies on an example of this kind
to raise trouble for “expressivist” theories of communication – which certainly include the
one I am assuming here. In Gauker’s example, a speaker utters ‘all of the red ones are
mine’, in a context in which (we might assume) there are two different but equally salient
domains of quantification, one which the speaker has in mind and with respect to which
his utterance is true, and another which the hearer has in mind and with respect to which
the utterance is false. We can easily describe similar cases for all expressions discussed
in this paper. In my view, the best strategy is to think of them as cases of Field’s (1973)
partial reference, giving them a supervaluationist rendering in our formal treatment. This
corresponds to what Gauker describes as a “neutral solution”. I lack the space here to
dispose of Gauker’s criticism of this type of response.
17 Carston does attempt to provide an alternative account of implicated contents, appeal-
ing to Sperber and Wilson’s “Relevance Theory”. I do not think that this offers any real
advantage to Grice’s account; and, in any event, I do not think that the relevance account
motivates Carston’s principle (or Recanati’s, for that matter) any better that Grice’s.
18 Nunberg has a second argument against the “implicature” analysis of descriptive uses
of indexicals. If this analysis were correct, he claims, we should expect that the same
readings would be available for sentences in which the relevant indexicals have been re-
placed by proper names or descriptions with the same reference (Nunberg 1993, 14–5, 21
and 32). This is a quite demanding application of Grice’s “non-detachability” requirement.
However, as Grice stressed, such a requirement only applies in so far as “the manner of
expression plays no role in the calculation” (Grice 1975, 39; see also Grice 1978, 43). The
examples at stake do not satisfy this condition, for the non-literal meaning is in part derived
with the essential help of the token-reflexive semantic rule associated with indexicals’
types.
19 Laurence (1996) defends a similar view: “According to [the Chomskian] view utterances
have the linguistic properties they do in virtue of being associated, in the course of language
processing, with mental representations having those properties . . . it is in virtue of being
associated, in language processing, with these representations that an utterance has the
linguistic properties it has” (Laurence 1996, 283–4).
20 Laurence seems to assume that his examples of subjects with the “linguistic module” in-
tact but severely limited general intellectual abilities are examples of subjects with “normal
linguistic abilities” (p. 287). If this means that the orders, assertions and so on that these
subjects make are “normal linguistic utterances”, it does contradict the Gricean view; but
I find the suggestion absurd. (I do not suppose the narratives of these subjects would pass
muster in court.)
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